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Abstract
Rhesus monkeys gather much of their knowledge of the social world through visual input and may preferentially represent
this knowledge in the visual modality. Recognition of familiar faces is clearly advantageous, and the flexibility and utility of
primate social memory would be greatly enhanced if visual memories could be accessed cross-modally either by visual or
auditory stimulation. Such cross-modal access to visual memory would facilitate flexible retrieval of the knowledge
necessary for adaptive social behavior. We tested whether rhesus monkeys have cross-modal access to visual memory for
familiar conspecifics using a delayed matching-to-sample procedure. Monkeys learned visual matching of video clips of
familiar individuals to photographs of those individuals, and generalized performance to novel videos. In crossmodal probe
trials, coo-calls were played during the memory interval. The calls were either from the monkey just seen in the sample
video clip or from a different familiar monkey. Even though the monkeys were trained exclusively in visual matching, the
calls influenced choice by causing an increase in the proportion of errors to the picture of the monkey whose voice was
heard on incongruent trials. This result demonstrates spontaneous cross-modal recognition. It also shows that viewing
videos of familiar monkeys activates naturally formed memories of real monkeys, validating the use of video stimuli in
studies of social cognition in monkeys.
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Introduction
Many primate species have complex social repertoires that
require individual recognition [1–7]. Field studies show that
nonhuman primates recognize social objects and social events
[5,7–12], but field studies cannot address most questions about
how nonhuman primates acquire complex social knowledge, or
how this knowledge is represented in the brain. Controlled
laboratory tests, in which learning is experimentally manipulated,
are required to address these important questions in social
cognition. To date, few such experimental studies of social
recognition have been conducted; far more effort has been
devoted to understanding how primates perceive, process, and
remember nonsocial stimuli (see a recent review [13]).
The ability to keep track of the social relations of conspecifics is
critical for survival in many species [5,14] and individual
recognition is a fundamental cognitive requirement for such
mental tracking of the social environment. In primates, visual
perception, especially of the face, is probably the most important
source of information for identifying others [15]. Monkeys and
apes do discriminate and identify specific faces (e.g. discrimination:
[16–22], ‘‘identification’’ using symbols: [23,24]), and recent
studies have begun to characterize the underlying perceptual
mechanisms for face recognition in nonhuman primates [25–29].
Most studies of individual recognition in monkeys have used still
image stimuli, but social agents move. Dynamic social agents
cannot be inspected in detail like still images, and the behavior of
social agents has the potential to overshadow processing of
physical features useful in individual identification. To understand
natural social cognition it is therefore important to study how
nonhumans extract information about dynamic social agents.
Playback experiments conducted in the field demonstrate that
monkeys recognize the dominance rank of other animals [30].
These findings motivated further study under more controlled
conditions with captive animals. Rhesus monkey subjects learned
to select dominant stimulus monkeys in video clips of both real
dominance interactions [31] and digitally edited artificial domi-
nance interactions [32]. Use of artificial social interactions in the
latter work allowed random assignment of stimulus monkeys to
ranks in an artificial hierarchy, thus controlling for non-behavioral
cues that might indicate dominance. Subject monkeys rapidly
learned to select the dominant monkey in these artificial social
interactions, but only weakly transferred performance to probe
videos containing no behavioral dominance information. These
results show that monkeys ‘‘read’’ the behavior in the videos very
effectively, but may have remembered little about the identities of
the unfamiliar monkeys depicted. Because this study used
unfamiliar stimulus monkeys, it is not possible to directly test
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tions of real world individuals and their dominance relations. The
current study determined whether monkeys perceive videos as
depicting actual monkeys, and whether they can extract
identifying information from dynamic video displays.
Audition is also important for identifying others, particularly
when distance or occluding objects render vision ineffective.
Playback experiments conducted in the field confirm that monkeys
discriminate voices of their group members and attribute them to
the calling individual [8,10,11]. For instance, adult female rhesus
macaques are more responsive to the contact calls of adult female
kin than to those of unrelated females in the group [33] and vervet
monkeys recognize third party kin relations on the basis of voice
alone [30,34].
Recognition of individuals by appearance, especially face, and
by voice is clearly advantageous, but the flexibility and utility of
primate social memory would be greatly enhanced if visual and
auditory memories could be accessed cross-modally by stimulation
in either modality [35]. For instance, human representations of
individuals appear to integrate visual and auditory features [36], as
evident when we visualize the speaker on the other end of a phone
call. Field playback experiments in which subject hear the call of a
particular individual, and then demonstrate that they expect to see
that individual or an associated individual, provide some of the
best evidence that cross-modal processing of individual identity is a
central part of primate social life. However, few laboratory studies
have tested for such cross-modal representations in primates. In
the first study of its kind, Guinea baboons (Papio papio), were
trained to discriminate between human and baboon vocalizations
and were then given probe trials in which either a human or a
baboon photo was presented just before a vocalization [37].
Priming with a photo matching the vocalizing species shortened
response time in one of the two baboons, suggesting that one
subject had formed arbitrary associations between species typical
sounds and visual appearance. The priming image may have
activated corresponding auditory representations in this one
baboon, leading to facilitation of processing the subsequent
auditory stimulus. More recent studies used a cross-modal version
of the expectancy violation procedure pioneered by Adachi and
his colleague [38]. Human or Japanese macaque vocalizations
were played repeatedly through two speakers, followed immedi-
ately by an image that either matched (congruent condition) or
mismatched (incongruent condition) the auditory stimulus.
Subjects looked longer at the image in the incongruent condition,
indicating that they had formed the expectation of seeing an image
consistent with the vocalization [38,39]. Other nonhumans also
appear to form cross-modal representations of ‘‘species’’ that they
are familiar with, for example human caretakers (dogs: [40]),
familiar conspecifics (grey-cheeked mangabeys (Lophocebus albigena):
[41]; horses: [42]), and familiar conspecifics and humans (rhesus
monkeys tested by preferential looking procedure; [43]). These
procedures that measure the spontaneous looking behaviour of
subjects are useful for comparisons across species because they
require no training of the subjects. However, they are limited by
the need for many subjects due to variability in looking time, and
by the fact that animals cannot be tested repeatedly due to
habituation. Detailed study of the nature of the animals’ mental
representations will require additional techniques.
In the present study, we focused on two aspects of individual
recognition in rhesus monkeys. First, we tested whether they could
recognize dynamic images of familiar individuals in video clips.
Second, we tested whether they had formed cross-modal
representations of those familiar individuals through experience
outside of our experiment, and whether those representations were
activated by seeing videos. We used a delayed matching-to-sample
procedure in which subjects were trained to visually match a video
clip of a familiar individual to a photograph of that individual
presented among 4 distracter images of other familiar monkeys.
Auditory stimuli were never used during training. In later probe
trials, a voice, either matching the sample video clip (congruent
trials) or not (incongruent trials), was played during a memory
interval. We assessed spontaneous cross-modal recognition by
determining the extent to which: 1) monkeys were more accurate
on congruent compared to incongruent trials, and, 2) errors made
on incongruent trials were to the image of the monkey whose voice
was played during the memory interval. Discrimination of familiar
conspecifics in video clips could, of course, be accomplished
without recognizing the stimuli as familiar conspecifics. Monkeys
might instead learn that specific properties of the videos occasion
specific test responses. However, spontaneous cross modal
recognition could occur only if the subject monkeys recognized
the individuals in the videos as those they live with. If monkeys did
not detect a correspondence between the videos and the real
monkeys, the untrained vocalizations could not systematically
affect choice behavior.
Experiment 1A
Method
Subjects. Subjects were five 4-year-old male rhesus monkeys
(Macaca mulatta) that had been raised in large semi-natural social
groups at the Yerkes Primate Center field station up to about 2.5
years of age. Each monkey shared a cage with a single compatible
companion. Monkeys had visual and auditory contact with
additional monkeys living in the same room. The Yerkes
National Primate Research Center is fully accredited by the
American Association for Accreditation of Laboratory Animal
Care. Animals were cared for and used in accord with the Guide
for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals published by the
National Academy Press and in a manner consistent with the
recommendations of the Weatherall Report on the use of non-
human primates in research. The procedures used in this study
were approved by Emory University’s Institutional Animal Care
and Use Committee (protocols 222-2004Y and 206-2007Y).
Among the steps taken to maximize welfare and minimize
suffering were the following. The monkeys were provided with
enrichment according to Yerkes policy to maximize psychological
well-being through visual and social stimulation. The investigators
used positive reinforcement training techniques to ensure calm
interactions with the monkeys, and for cognitive testing. The
majority of cognitive testing was conducted in the home cage
environment in the presence of established social companions. No
potentially painful procedures were used in these studies.
Apparatus. Monkeys were trained in their home cage using
an apparatus consisting of a 15-inch color LCD monitor with a
capacitance touch sensor (3 M, St. Paul, MN), two food dispensers
(Med Associates, St. Albans, VT; one delivered banana flavored
monkey pellets and the other miniature chocolate candies), and a
loudspeaker, all of which attached to the front of the cage housing
the monkey. Testing was controlled by a personal computer with
custom software written using Presentation (Neurobehavioral
Systems, Albany, CA).
Stimuli. Each subject monkey was assigned 160 silent
5 second videos clips (6406480 pixels, 30 fps) consisting of 32
videos of his cagemate, and 32 videos from each of four other
familiar monkeys that lived in the same room in auditory and
visual contact with the subject monkey. Twenty six video clips
from each set of 32 were used in a series of training and testing
Cross-Modal Representations in Rhesus Monkeys
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showed individual stimulus monkeys in the same cage and were
generated under identical lighting conditions. The six video clips
in each set used for the final transfer test were filmed from a hole
on the backside of each monkey’s home cage and thus depicted
substantially different views of the monkeys from those in the
training videos. Face-on still pictures (2006200 pixels) of the same
stimulus monkeys shown in the videos were used as choice stimuli.
Procedure. During training and testing monkeys remained in
the homecage, but pairs were separated by panels with holes cut in
them such that social interaction was possible but monkeys could
only reach the computer screen in their own cage. Figure 1 (top
row) depicts the delayed matching-to-sample task used. Each trial
started when the subjects touched a green rectangle twice. A
5 second video clip of one stimulus monkey then played in the
center of the monitor as a sample stimulus. After the video ended,
the last frame remained on the monitor. Two touches on the last
frame extinguished it and resulted in the appearance of still
pictures of the five stimulus monkeys, one located in each of the
four corners and one in the middle of the top of the monitor. The
locations of these five pictures were randomly determined on each
trial. Touching the choice stimulus that corresponded to the
sample was reinforced by the automatic delivery of food, whereas
touching the incorrect comparison stimulus was followed by a half
second time-out and a correction procedure. In the correction
procedure the trial was repeated up to three times. If the monkey
erred in all of these trials, a final trial was given in which only the
correct choice appeared at test.
Monkeys were trained and tested in this visual matching-to-
sample task in five phases. In Phase 1, subject monkeys were
trained with two video clips from each stimulus monkey (10 videos
total). After performing at above 90% correct in two consecutive
sessions, the monkeys proceeded to Phase 2, in which they
received six new video clips from each stimulus monkey (30 new
videos total) in addition to the two trained clips. Every time
monkeys reached the criterion of 90% or better in two consecutive
sessions, they proceeded to the next phase with six new video clips
from each stimulus monkey. In the first session of each of the
phases 2–5, each new video clip was presented only once and we
did not use the correction procedure. We therefore measured
performance in the very first exposure to each of the 30 new videos
in the new set of test stimuli in these initial sessions. At the end of
Phase 5, monkeys were therefore required to perform above 90%
correct with 26 videos from each stimulus monkey (a total of 130
videos).
In the final transfer test, monkeys received two test sessions in
which the 30 transfer videos (6 from each stimulus monkey) that
had been filmed through a hole in the back of the homecage were
interspersed among 130 control trials consisting of all the video
clips from phases 1 through 5 To prevent any new learning in
these final generalization test trials, monkeys were always
rewarded, irrespective of the accuracy of their choice.
Results
Monkeys learned to select the comparison still image corre-
sponding to the sample videos. Accuracy on the first exposure to
novel sets of videos improved with successive introductions until
performance with novel videos did not differ from that with highly
familiar videos (Figure 2; t-tests comparing familiar with novel
videos: 2nd phase: t(4)=6.175, p,.01, 3rd phase: t(4)=1.618, n.s.,
4th phase: t(4)=1.199, n.s., 5th phase: t(4)=.734, n.s.). In the
transfer test with videos collected from an entirely new perspective
and in a different context, monkeys transferred matching
Figure 1. This figure shows schematic diagrams of the visual matching-to-sample tasks used in the current study. The top panel
depicts the task used in Experiment 1 and as baseline in Experiment 2 (Standard visual matching trials). The lower panel depicts test trials in
Experiment 2 (Cross-modal probe trials).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023345.g001
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expected by chance (Figure 2; t(4)=8.572, p,0.01) though
performance was significantly lower than with the novel stimulus
set used in phase 5 (t(4)=27.387, p,0.01).
Experiment 1B
In Experiment 1A, the last frame of each clip remained on the
screen until subjects touched it. This procedure was used to ensure
that monkeys studied the sample before responding. However,
monkeys may have used the last frames to solve the task, rather
than the dynamic information in the videos. In Experiment 1B, we
tested whether monkeys could solve the task using the movie in
real time, without the last frames remaining on the screen. The
same apparatus used in Experiment 1A was used again. The
procedure differed from Experiment 1A only in that the screen
went black and the choice stimuli were presented immediately
after the videos ended.
Results
Monkeys transferred matching performance to the test trials
without the last frame frozen (Figure 2, rightmost bar). All five
subjects continued to perform significantly better than expected by
chance (each subject p,.001 by binomial test). Performance was
numerically almost identical to that shown in the last block of
testing with videos followed by a still frame. Subjects appear to
have focused on the dynamic information in the videos rather than
using the last still frame to identify the correct choice at test.
Experiment 2
Monkeys accurately matched short videos to still images of
familiar monkeys in Experiment 1, and generalized this perfor-
mance on the first exposures to never before seen videos. Even
when we tested our subjects with videos from substantially
different views and context in a final transfer test, they showed
significant transfer of matching performance. These results show
that monkeys extracted invariant features from a subset of videos
that allowed them to generalize selection of the appropriate still
image across the considerable variation in the sample videos.
While such successful generalization suggests that the monkeys
recognize the familiar monkeys depicted in the videos as those they
live with, it is possible that performance is based strictly on
similarity among the videos, with no reference to memories of the
familiar monkeys formed outside the context of the experiment.
Indeed, many experiments show that animals learn to accurately
classify images into categories even when they have had no real
world experience with the individual items being classified or with
the categories (e.g. laboratory pigeons appropriately classify
images of cats, cars, flowers, and chairs [44]).
In Experiment 2, we tested whether viewing videos of familiar
monkeys activated memories of those monkeys that were formed
during real social interactions outside of the context of our
experiment. Because our monkeys were trained exclusively with
images in Experiment 1, they have no basis in our training for
mapping monkey voices to the videos or still images used in these
experiments. Only natural experience with vocalizations and faces
Figure 2. Line Graph: Generalization to novel videos in Experiment 1A. The uppermost line (diamond symbols, dashed line) represents trials
with all familiar videos from previous phases of training, only during test sessions in which new videos were introduced. The lower data line (square
symbols, solid line) represents performance on the first exposure to newly introduced videos. The bottom dashed line indicates accuracy expected by
chance. Bars: Generalization to test trials in Experiment 1A and Experiment 1B. The bar with checker pattern represents performance in probe trials
with novel videos depicting stimulus monkeys from the novel perspective of the back of a housing cage, during a single test session (Experiment 1A).
The hatched bar represents performance in probe trials in which the screen went black and choice images appeared immediately after the video
ended.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023345.g002
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auditory properties of the stimulus monkeys. We reasoned that if
hearing monkey vocalizations systematically biased test perfor-
mance in our visual matching task, then performance must be
mediated in part by cross-modal memories of the real monkeys
formed during social interactions in the colony room. We
therefore tested whether the rhesus monkeys in our study have
multimodal access to memories of familiar conspecifics.
Subjects and apparatus
In order to use auditory stimuli, monkeys were removed from
the home cage and isolated in a sound attenuating booth for
testing sessions. Isolation was necessary because coo calls played in
the housing room elicited many coo calls from other animals in the
room. Because the other monkeys living in the room were the
stimulus monkeys used in this study, calls from these monkeys,
whether elicited or spontaneous, would interfere with testing. All
previous testing with these monkeys had been conducted in the
home cage in a very familiar social context. Perhaps because of
this extensive experience with testing in the home cage, we had
difficulty adapting the monkeys to the visual and auditory social
isolation of the sound attenuating booths. Despite many weeks of
daily experience in the booths, we were only able to adapt two of
the five monkeys sufficiently well to permit participation in this
study (M1 and M2).
Stimuli. Coo calls, which are a contact call known to carry
identity information (e.g. [45]), were recorded from each stimulus
monkey using a digital audio recorder (Marantz PMD660) and a
‘‘shotgun’’ microphone (Sennheiser ME 66). Recordings were
converted to WAV format sampled at 44.1 KHz and 16-bit
resolution. The duration of each vocalization was approximately
750 ms.
Procedure. Before beginning cross-modal tests, the
performance of monkeys was titrated to approximately 60%
accuracy by gradually increasing the delay between sample and
test. This was done to ensure that monkeys would make a sufficient
number of mistakes for analysis of errors and that performance
could both increase and decrease as a result of hearing
vocalizations. Titration was done in the home cage and later
confirmed in the testing booth. At the conclusion of titration, the
delay between the end of the sample videos and the appearance of
the still choice images for the test trials was 18 s for M1 and 24 s
for M2.
Subjects received 15 test sessions, each consisting of 30 all-
reinforced cross-modal probe trials interspersed among 160
baseline vision only trials identical to those used during training.
For the baseline trials, the delay lengths were randomized among
.5, 4.0, 8.0, and either 18.0 (for M1) or 24.0 sec (for M2). This
distribution of delay intervals was intended to maintain motivation
and to prevent monkeys from predicting which trials were probe
trials. Cross-modal probe trials began the same way as normal
trials, with presentation of a 5 second video clip, followed by two
touches to the last frame by the subject monkey. Immediately after
the monkeys touched the last frame of the video, a vocalization
was played. The delay of 18 or 24 seconds ensued, followed by
presentation of the 5 still images of monkeys used in all previous
testing. For each session, one of the 32 clips from each stimulus
monkey was used as a sample stimulus in probe trials. We
presented three test conditions in each session. In the congruent
condition, a vocalization from the same monkey seen in the
sample video was played just after the sample stimulus disappeared
(5 trials, one from each stimulus monkey). In the incongruent
condition, a vocalization from a stimulus monkey other than the
one seen during the sample phase of the trial was played (20 trials,
4 from each stimulus monkey, thereby pairing each stimulus
monkey with each possible incongruent vocalization). In the
control condition no vocalization was played but the same delay
was used as on the other test trials (5 trials, one from each stimulus
monkey; see Figure 1B). At the conclusion of the 15 sessions of
crossmodal testing we therefore had 75 congruent probe trials, 300
incongruent probe trials, and 75 control trials from each of the two
subject monkeys. Monkeys were never trained to use the
vocalizations to guide their test response; to prevent learning
during the probe trials all responses on these trials were rewarded
whether correct or not.
We hypothesized that if monkeys have cross-modal represen-
tations of familiar monkeys, hearing a vocalization would activate
a representation of the vocalizing monkey and that representation
would facilitate (Congruent trials) or interfere with (Incongruent
trials) visual matching accuracy. We also assessed interference by
determining whether errors on Incongruent trials were made more
often than expected by chance to the image of the monkey whose
voice was heard during the memory interval.
Results
In all test conditions, both monkeys were more accurate than
expected by chance (binomial tests, p,.01; Figure 3). To examine
the effect of the vocalizations that were played during the memory
interval, we conducted paired t-tests for each combination of the
three conditions in each monkey, with alpha set at 0.0167 to
control for multiple comparisons. For M2, performance in the
Congruent condition was significantly higher than in the
Incongruent condition, but neither condition differed from the
Control condition (Incongruent vs. Congruent: t(14)=3.263,
p=.003; Congruent vs Control: t (14)=.501, n.s.; Incongruent
vs Control: t (14)=21.640, n.s.). For M1, there were no significant
differences in performance among the three conditions (Congruent
vs Incongruent: t (14)=2.486, n.s.; Congruent vs Control: t
(14)=.164, n.s.; Incongruent vs Control: t(14)=1.097, n.s.). We
also analyzed choice behavior on trials on which monkeys
committed an error. Both monkeys picked the image of the
vocalizing monkey more often than expected by chance (25%)
when committing an error (Figure 4; binomial tests: M1, p,.01;
M2, p,.05).
Monkeys did not perform exactly at the targeted level of 60%
correct in this final stage of testing. It is not clear whether the
differences from the titrated levels are experimental noise, an effect
of the surprising recorded monkey calls on attention or motivation,
or other changes resulting from continued testing. In any case,
these shifts in accuracy on control trials do not affect our ability to
interpret the results of the present experiment because perfor-
mance in probe trials is compared to concurrently run control
trials.
Discussion
In Experiment 1A monkeys initially learned to match a set of 10
videos to still pictures of 5 familiar monkeys. Generalization to
new videos improved greatly following experience with more
videos, until performance with novel videos was indistinguishable
from that with familiar videos. Subjects continued to perform well
above the level expected by chance in very challenging
generalization tests with videos collected from a new view and in
a different context (Figure 2). While the significant generalization
observed clearly demonstrates that the subject monkeys did not
memorize videos or use low level perceptual processes to identify
stimulus monkeys, accuracy in these very challenging generaliza-
tion tests was lower than accuracy in less challenging tests. Lower
Cross-Modal Representations in Rhesus Monkeys
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including the somewhat poorer quality of these videos, which were
taken through a small hole in the cage, and the possibility that the
attention of monkeys is drawn away from the stimulus monkey
shown in the video by the many new objects also visible for the first
time in the novel view videos.
Experiment 1B, showed that monkeys did not depend on the
last still frame of videos to guide their matching performance in
Experiment 1A. They continued to perform accurately even
though the screen went black immediately after the video ended,
meaning that the final frame was on screen for just 1/30 seconds.
This finding does not rule out use of information in the last frame,
Figure 3. Proportion of correct choices on trials with a vocalization from the monkey seen in the sample video (Congruent), without
a vocalization (Control), or with a vocalization from a monkey other than the one seen in the sample video (Incongruent) in
Experiment 2. Accuracy expected by chance is 0.2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023345.g003
Figure 4. Proportion of errors made by selecting the vocalizing monkey in incongruent trials from Experiment 2. The dashed line
represents the proportion of choices expected by chance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023345.g004
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monkeys to perform accurately. Thus it is likely that subject
monkeys used the dynamic content of the videos to identify the
stimulus monkeys, rather than any single brief video frame. These
successful generalizations suggest that the monkeys recognized the
individuals depicted across the full set of videos. However, it is
possible that the monkeys based their test choices on superficial
similarities shared by all the videos of a given stimulus monkey,
rather than by reference to representations of those monkeys
formed during live interactions with them in the colony room.
Thus, the data from Experiment 1 do not conclusively show that
monkeys perceived the videos as depictions of monkeys they know.
Despite the fact that we had trained monkeys exclusively to
follow a visual matching rule in Experiment 1, hearing
vocalizations systematically biased choice behavior in Experiment
2. When monkeys heard the voice of a different monkey than the
one they saw in a sample video clip, both of the subjects made
errors by selecting the image of the owner of the voice more often
than expected by chance. This effect was significant for each
monkey but was not large. The small size of the effect is consistent
with the fact that the monkeys had never been trained to use
auditory information to guide choices at test. Training in the social
context of the housing room may, indeed, have taught monkeys to
actively ignore vocalizations they heard during testing because
they were not relevant to the rewarded visual matching task. The
fact that the monkeys showed significant effects from the auditory
information at all is remarkable and indicates spontaneous cross
modal recognition. One of the two subjects also showed better
performance in Congruent trials (on which video and voice
matched) than in Incongruent trials (on which video and voice did
not match). Together, these results indicate that the monkeys had
cross-modal representations of the familiar monkeys depicted in
the videos. Hearing the voices of these monkeys crossmodally
activated visual representations of them, and these representations
sometimes superseded the representations activated by seeing the
sample video. Apparently, sometimes the monkeys could not
discriminate between active visual representations that resulted
from seeing a video and those resulting from hearing a voice.
It is important to note that the monkeys had not been trained to
associate the voices and visual information in these experiments.
They were trained to focus exclusively on visual information.
However, the presentation of vocalizations impacted visual-visual
matching performance. The cross-modal representations demon-
strated here must have been acquired in natural social interactions
in the colony room. This study therefore shows that video stimuli
used in laboratory based cognitive tests can activate memories
formed during natural social encounters. The interaction of
auditory and visual information we observed could only occur if
the monkeys regarded the videos as depicting familiar monkeys.
These findings set the stage for further ecologically valid
laboratory studies of social cognition using videos.
In the current study we found that coo calls evoked visual
information in subject monkeys. In future studies, it will be of
interest to test whether other call types or visual information
similarly activate common representations. Such studies will allow
us to assess the function of these signals in primate social life in well
controlled experimental studies.
Monkeys likely discriminate others based on various other
attributes, in addition to identity. For instance, kin-recognition and
sex categorization must play a fundamental role in reproductive
success in primates, so primates should be keenly attuned to
information specifying kinship and sex. For example, previous
studies reported that some primate species can detect kinship
visually [46] and vocally [30,47]. More recently, it is reported that
body parts with conspicuous sexual features (male scrotum or
female nipples) facilitate discrimination of gender in Japanese
monkeys [48]. Such studies have been limited to the visual
modality or auditory modality only and can potentially be
explained by basic perceptual level discrimination, without
reference to any more abstract concept of sex or kinship. The
general approach used here could be extended to test for the
existence abstract social concepts such as ‘‘sex’’ or ‘‘kin.’’ Only
conceptual representations that exist at a level more abstract than
perception would be spontaneously activated crossmodally.
An important aspect of cross-modal representation awaiting
clarification is whether there is any preferred or privileged
direction of cross-modal activation, or a dominant modality of
representation. Monkeys showed cross-modal activation both in
the visual to auditory direction [37] and the auditory to visual
direction (current study). While only one of two baboons in the
former study showed evidence of visual to auditory activation,
both subjects in our study showed evidence of auditory to visual
activation. Animals that rely on vision as the primary perceptual
modality for the control of behavior, may show visual dominance
in mental representation, favoring visual representations accessible
by other modalities rather than representations in those other
modalities per se. To examine this issue directly, future studies
might compare visually dominant with auditory dominant species
for the ease with which auditory and visual stimulation activate
representations in the other modality.
These experiments show that video stimuli elicit sophisticated
information processing sufficient for individual recognition in
rhesus monkeys. In conjunction with other recent findings that
suggest ecologically relevant processing of videos by monkeys
viewing faces [28,29], and assessing social behavior [31,32], these
results encourage increased use of carefully controlled video
stimuli in studies of primate social cognition. Spontaneous cross-
modal activation of visual representations of familiar monkeys by
their vocalizations unequivocally demonstrates that our subject
monkeys regarded video stimuli as depicting monkeys they knew.
Whether they saw them in videos or heard their voices, memories
of the monkeys they knew were activated.
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